losophical system while neglecting the details of its architecture . . . we would here evoke Kantism: to find a meaning in the human without measuring it by ontology, without knowing and without asking 'how does it stand with . . .?', outside of mortality and immortality-that, perhaps, is the Copernican revolution." 2 Elsewhere, Levinas writes:
To be sure, across these returns of ontology, Kant was bold enough to formulate a more radical distinction between thought and knowing. He discovers in the practical usage of pure reason a plot which is not reducible to a reference to being. A good will, as it were utopian, deaf to the information, indifferent to the confirmations, that could come to it from being (which are important for technique and for the hypothetical imperative, but do not concern practice nor the categorical imperative), precedes from a freedom situated above being and prior to knowing and ignorance. 3 Together, these passages-along with many others that I have not quoted heresuggest that Kant's conception of the moral law and everything that goes with it is more subtle than a quick review of the categorical imperative would indicate. Indeed, Kant suggests that "the concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by an apodictic law of practical reason, is the keystone of the whole architecture of the system of pure reason and even of speculative reason." 4 When we understand that, for Kant, consciousness of freedom hangs only on a prior consciousness of the moral law, 5 the entire domain of speculative reason sits on a moral foundation. Similarly, while the existence of a noumenal self is called into question in the Critique of Pure Reason, it is given when considered from a moral viewpoint:
I can also understand why the most weighty criticisms of the Critique which have come to my attention turn about these two points: first, the reality of the categories as applied to noumena, which is denied in theoretical knowledge but affirmed in practical; and second, the paradoxical demand to regard one's self, as subject to freedom, as noumenon, and yet from the point of view of nature to think of one's self as a phenomenon in one's own empirical consciousness. So long as one had no definite concept of morality and freedom, no conjecture could be made concerning what the noumenon was which should be posited as the ground of the alleged appearance, and even whether it was possible to form a 2. Levinas, "Humanism and An-archy," in Emmanuel Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) Arts, 1985) , 3.
5. See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 29 : "It is . . . the moral law, of which we become immediately conscious as soon as we construct maxims for the will, which first presents itself to us; and since reason exhibits it as a ground of determination which is completely independent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous condition, it is the moral law which leads directly to the concept of freedom." This section of text continues by addressing the question, "But how is the consciousness of that moral law possible?" I will take up this question later in this paper. Earlier in the Critique, Kant writes, "Freedom, however, among all the ideas of speculative reason is the only one whose possibility we know a priori. We do not understand it, but we know it as the condition of the moral law which we do know" (4). concept of it, since all the concepts of the pure understanding in their theoretical employment had already been assigned exclusively to mere appearances. 6 Indeed, the very foundation of the self hangs on understanding itself as free, which requires a prior consciousness of the moral law. These are Levinasian themes: that the rational order is founded upon sociality, where an ethical obligation emerges prior to intellection as its condition, and that the full sense of self, subjectivity at its deepest level, is already bound by the ethical. Thus, Kant and Levinas share a profound point of contact.
In what follows, I would like to examine this intersection of ideas by situating Levinas's work "beneath" Kant's in order to show that the common criticism waged against Kant in the first paragraph of this paper is too hard and fast. Kant's ethics already respects the concrete other at its very foundations, even if Kant did not trace the categorical imperative down to this level. I will attempt to show this by reading Levinas's thought as a foundation for an ethics that, when transposed into the rational order, turns Kantian. Levinas marks the path for us:
When one sets up freedoms alongside of one another like forces which affirm one another in negating one another, one ends up with war, where each limits the others. They inevitably contest or are ignorant of one another, that is, exercise but violence and tyranny. . . . This order of tyranny and exteriority can be replaced by a rational order where the relations between separate wills are reduced to the common participation of wills in reason, which is not exterior to wills. This is the State. It is the interiorization of external relations. . . . But the subordination of the will to impersonal reason, to discourse in itself, to written laws, requires discourse as the encounter of man with man.
7
The face-to-face encounter of person to person establishes an ethical moment that returns to a rational order. 8 6. Ibid., 6-7. I take Kant to be saying that the self in empirical consciousness is a phenomenon only, whereas it is graspable as a noumenon in moral consciousness. The same theme is echoed elsewhere in the Critique, where Kant opposes the sensuous nature of the self to the supersensuous. The first is attainable in empirical consciousness; the second is "nature under the autonomy of the pure practical reason" (44).
7. Levinas, "Freedom and Command," in Emmanuel Levinas: Collected Philosophical Papers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 22-23. 8. See also Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 22, where Levinas characterizes the transition from the concrete to the universal in religious terms: "Morality will oppose politics in history and will have gone beyond the functions of prudence or the canons of the beautiful to proclaim itself unconditional and universal when the eschatology of messianic peace will have come to superpose itself upon the ontology of war." Kantians will, no doubt, see in this passage Levinas's idea that ethics will not overcome prudence and beauty to achieve its perfect form in universality, that is, that ethics will not achieve Kantian purity, until the ontology of war has been overcome by messianic peace. This is a topic for a separate essay, but the critical point here is that it indicates that Levinas will permit ethics to return to the rational order. Elsewhere, after clarifying the emergence of responsibility and justice in the face-to-face, Levinas Showing the complete movement from Levinas's ethical metaphysics to the higher reaches of Kantian universality far exceeds the scope of a single paper. Here it is possible only to open up a dialogue that starts in that direction, which I propose to do by identifying the precise point where the ethical metaphysics of Kant and Levinas intersect. Identifying this point will allow us nothing more than an understanding of the problem, what I take to be the problem of ethical metaphysics. Its solution will have to await another work. Additionally, we will be left at the end with many other concomitant problems that will appear to be beyond resolution, not the least of which will be the different way that the self emerges in each viewpoint. For Levinas, the self is asymmetrically situated in relation to the other, whereas in Kant the self is granted the same rights as any other rational agent. This apparent contradiction, along with many others, arises precisely because the two thinkers are approaching ethics from different directions. Kant is working within a rationality already endowed with an ought; Levinas is working at a level prior to the emergence of the rational order, where the ought first becomes incumbent on the self, thereby transposing it into the institutionalized order of practical reason.
Of course, Kant recognizes this transposition: "the law of pure will, which is free, puts the will in a sphere entirely different from the empirical"; 9 and, later in the same work, "the moral law ideally transfers us into a nature in which reason would bring forth the highest good were it accompanied by sufficient physical capacities; and it determines our will to impart to the sensuous world the form of a system of rational beings."
10 Insofar as consciousness of the moral law enacts this transformation, how we become conscious of the moral law is the critical question hanging in the balance of Kantian ethics. But this is precisely the question that Kant cannot answer.
Indeed, Kant sought the universal conditions of morality as they followed from rationality. In so doing, he could identify that the ideas of morality and freedom were concomitantly related (along with reason itself), but he could not show that any of these ever materialized in concrete experience. Toward the end of the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, he writes, "we have finally traced the determinate concept of morality back to the idea of freedom, but we could not prove freedom to be something actual in ourselves and in human nature."
11 On the next page, he writes:
we are not as yet able to have any insight into why it is that we should divorce ourselves from such interest, i.e., that we should consider ourselves as free in action and yet hold ourselves as subject to certain laws so as to find solely in our own person a worth that can compensate us for the loss of everything that gives worth to our condition. We do not see how this is possible and hence how the moral law can obligate us. One must frankly admit that there is here a sort of circle from which, so it seems, there is no way to escape.
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Even though Kant can align the concepts of freedom, reason and the moral law, it would seem that the obligating force of morality has slipped beneath his grip, and he is left to analyze the idea of moral obligation in its place.
In what follows, Kant attempts to make up for the fact that the concrete moral moment falls out of his analysis by arguing that insofar as we must think of ourselves as free, we must also think of ourselves as moral: "now we see that when we think of ourselves as free, we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and know the autonomy of the will together with its consequence, morality; whereas when we think of ourselves as obligated, we consider ourselves as belonging to the world of sense and yet at the same time to the intelligible world."
13 Insofar as we must think of ourselves as rational, we are bound to be ethical. How reason finds itself in this condition is another matter.
The same difficulty passes from the Grounding to the Critique of Practical Reason, where it is even more pronounced. Defining the parameters of this later work, Kant writes:
This Critique concerns itself only with whether and how reason can be practical, i.e., how it can directly determine the will. In this inquiry no objection can be raised that the Critique begins with pure practical laws and their reality. Instead of intuition, it makes the concept of their existence in the intelligible world, i.e., freedom, its foundation. For this concept has no other meaning, and these laws are possible only in relation to the freedom of the will; but, if the will is presupposed as free, then they are necessary. Conversely, freedom is necessary because those laws are necessary, being practical postulates. How this consciousness of the moral laws or-what amounts to the same thing-how this consciousness of freedom is possible cannot be further explained; its permissibility, however, is established in the theoretical Critique. 14 So, once again, Kant begins within reason, finding it ethical at its deepest level without being able to explain how it became that way, though for the purposes of his project, it is not necessary that he do so. Indeed, this is one of the most impressive consequences of the critical method: that it should find ethics at the bottom of our rational faculties, without having to trace its origin to its existential conditions. Even so, the common criticism that it is not always clear how Kant's ideal principle of morality applies to cases in the concrete world seems to be sound. Even in his own test cases in the Grounding, he seems 12. Ibid., 52; my emphasis. 13. Ibid., 54. 14. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 47; my emphasis. to need to violate the logic of his own approach in order to account for deeper moral intuitions. 15 Part of this difficulty may lie in the fact that Kant treats morality itself as something that exists in its own right, that is, as thing-in-itself. Within the ideal sphere into which the self is transported by becoming conscious of the moral law, this may well be justified. Within this sphere idealities take on the status of realities, even without an existential grounding, and the self itself emerges as a noumenon that necessarily exists. This, again, is a fundamental insight of Kant's moral philosophy. But this does not mean that outside the moral sphere these idealities have the same objective validity. If consciousness of the moral law transports the self into a moral domain within which its own existence as moral agent is validated and morality emerges as a thing-in-itself, we can ask about the condition of the ego prior to this consciousness and address the question of its departure from the empirical world into the practical.
In other words, how consciousness of the moral law emerges as it enacts this transposition from the empirical world into the higher reaches of Kantian universality is no small or morally irrelevant question. Indeed, it seems to be the precise question that guides Levinas's Totality and Infinity, which begins, "'The true life is absent.' But we are in the world. Metaphysics arises and is maintained in this alibi. It is turned toward the 'elsewhere' and the 'otherwise' and the 'other'." 16 The transformation from the egoist world into a moral dimension is, for Levinas, characterized as this metaphysical movement from self to other, which is initiated by an other that calls into question my egoist desire, that sets limits on the satisfaction of my worldly desires. When we realize that, for Kant as well, morality sets limits on our inclinations, we can see that the moral law in Kant is other than a desire. Indeed, Kant's insistence that inclination cannot be used to ground morality sets the entire moral dimension in opposition to any egoist desire. Even though it emerges within consciousness, the moral law has its origins elsewhere. 17 15. Respecting both the "rusting talents" example and the "charity" example, Kant notes that the maxims to let one's talents rust or to give charity can indeed be consistently universalized without leading to a conflict between the subjective maxim and the objective law. Just as the reader expects him to admit the morality of letting one's talents rust or of not giving charity, Kant seems to make a spurious appeal to natures that do not arise from the universality of law as such. In the first case, for instance, he must add, "For as a rational being he necessarily wills that all his faculties should be developed, inasmuch as they are given him for all sorts of possible purposes" (31). Even when Kant turns to these cases again later in the Grounding to treat them under the ends and means formulation of the categorical imperative, he is faced with a similar difficulty. He notes that in each case the action does not conflict with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. But this is not enough. Precisely at this point another surprise enters. It is not enough that conflict is avoided; we are obligated to go further and promote humanity as an end in itself, which seems to go well beyond the passive conditions of respecting it or even not conflicting with it. See pages 36-37. Thus, it seems that Kant wishes to find in the categorical imperative more moral authority than it can deliver.
16. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 33. 17. This point is difficult to see in Kant, particularly against the backdrop of Levinas's thought, because of ambiguities surrounding the terms autonomy and heteronomy. On the surface, it looks like heteronomy means being determined by an other and autonomy being determined by the self. But the other of heteronomy is not the other person that calls my egoist desire into question; it is instead the object of an inclination.
To make sense of all of this, it is necessary that we consider Kant's moral law as a naturalized object in the style of Husserl. A "naturalized object" is an ideal object, a thing-in-itself, that is discovered on the basis of its supposed appearances in concrete experience. Husserl's first examples apply naturalism to material objects. The perceptions of a material object arise one at a time in a succession of appearances or perspectives that lead to the conclusion that "behind" these appearances there exists a thing-in-itself that causes them. Naturalism comports itself toward these "things-in-themselves" as if they were absolute objects, failing to treat them in relation to the perceptions from which they were abstracted: By interpreting the ideal world which is discovered by science on the basis of the changing and elusive world of perception as absolute being, of which the perceptible world would be only a subjective appearance, naturalism betrays the internal meaning of perceptual experience. Physical nature has meaning only with respect to an existence which is revealed through the relativity of Abschattungen [perspectives]-and this is the sui generis mode of existing of material reality.
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In addition to material objects, naturalism cuts across the range of ideal objects as well. "Besides consciousness [and material objects], naturalism is also obliged to naturalize everything which is either ideal or general-numbers, geometrical essences, etc.-if it wants to attribute to them any reality at all." 19 Levinas aptly summarizes this process of naturalization:
the specific being of nature imposes the search, in the midst of a multiple and changing reality, for a causality which is behind it. One must start from what is immediately given and go back to that reality which accounts for what is given. The movement of science is not so much the passage from the particular to the general as it is the passage from the concrete sensible to the hypothetical superstructure which claims to realize what is intimated in the subjective phenomena. In other words: the essential movement of a truth-oriented thought consists in the construction of a supremely real world on the basis of the concrete world in which we live. This method is the rejection of everything that is immediate, concrete, and irreducible in direct perception. 20 Similarly, the self of autonomy is not the self that has egoist desires; instead it sets limits to these desires and, as such, must be situated beyond them. Levinas seems to be aware of these difficulties when, in his essay "Freedom and Command," he writes, "the apparent heteronomy of a command is in reality but an autonomy, for the freedom to command is not a blind force but a rational act of thought. A will can accept the order of another will only because it finds that order in itself. The exteriority of the command is but inwardness. If the order is contrary to reason, it will come up against the absolute resistance of reason" (15). Later in the same essay, Levinas identifies heteronomy with inclination: "True heteronomy begins when obedience ceases to be obedient consciousness and becomes an inclination" (16).
18. Levinas The danger of naturalism is that it obscures the meaning of the concrete, seeing it only as an instantiation of some ideal entity behind it. It obscures the subjective elements of experience. This is a problem when we are trying to determine how the moral law can obligate a concrete moral subject. That Kant cannot find the obligating force of morality in reason may indicate that he is dealing with a naturalized entity that, due to the process of naturalization, has already transformed the sanction of morality in the handing down of the law into the universality of the rational order and obscured its concrete significance.
In what follows, I will treat Kant's moral law as one of these naturalized ideal entities in order to respond to this problem. In so doing, I will attempt to unearth the subjective elements of moral experience that make ethics (prior to the emergence of a formal moral law) applicable to the self in its concrete moral life, thereby returning Kantian universality to something more along the lines of Levinas. This will help us discover which concrete moments or appearances make us conscious of the moral law and transport us into the ideal world within which moral concepts acquire objective validity. In turn, this will provide an access outside the circle of freedom, reason, and the moral law from which Kant cannot escape. Fortunately, Kant himself has already marked the terrain for us by the method that he follows in articulating his moral philosophy.
In his translator's introduction to the Critique of Practical Reason, Beck notes that "for each of the first two Critiques, Kant wrote a briefer, less 'scholastic,' work on the same topics. The shorter works follow the analytical or regressive method; they begin with experience and regress upon its a priori presuppositions or principles without which it would not be possible to have that kind of experience." 21 The shorter work for the Second Critique is the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals mentioned above. In this work, Kant makes a "Transition from the Ordinary Rational Knowledge of Morality to the Philosophical,"
22 beginning with an analysis of the concept of the good will. This concept, properly considered, includes an implicit reference to duty. Furthermore, the concept of duty is only comprehensible in contrast to our inclinations, and as such the moral ought sets a limit to the satisfaction of our worldly desires. According to Kant, this awareness is embedded in our ordinary understanding of the good will.
To illustrate this point, Kant presents four test cases designed to make explicit to his reader what is already implicit in the concept of a good will. He begins by considering all possible human acts to determine which can be moral. Human acts proceed from the will and, therefore, require a motive. There are two possible motives for human acts:
21. Beck, introduction to Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, vii. 22 . This is the title of the first section of the Grounding. The second section is titled, "Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to a Metaphysics of Morals," and the third, "Transition from a Metaphysics of Morals to a Critique of Pure Practical Reason." The last section marks a passage from the analytic method of the Grounding to the synthetic method of the Critique, where the direction of investigation is reversed. Here, Kant begins with the concepts unearthed in the Grounding in order to deduce them from a priori reason. Even so, concerning the second work, Kant writes, "It presupposes the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals [the translation Beck provides for the title of the Grounding], but only insofar as that work gives a preliminary acquaintance with the principle of duty and justifies a definite formula of it; otherwise it is an independent work." See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 8. They may follow from the desires of the body (inclination) or the dictates of duty (here, the moral law). This immediately leads to three classifications of acts. Some acts violate duty, but follow an inclination. Since these acts disagree with the moral law, Kant notes that they cannot proceed from a good will.
In the second place, some acts follow an inclination, but still accord with duty. Kant further divides these acts into two subcategories, noting that there are two kinds of inclinations, mediate and immediate. Acts that follow a mediate inclination but still accord with duty are done with an ulterior motive in mind, like helping my boss change a flat tire because I know that she is writing performance appraisals next week and I want a raise. Here, the motive of my act is getting a raise, not changing a tire or helping a person in need. Kant notes that these acts are immoral because they are not done with duty in mind, but with the hopes of satisfying a desire.
Acts that follow an immediate inclination but accord with duty are acts that are done because I am naturally inclined to do them. Here, I will use Kant's example: "To be beneficent where one can is a duty; and besides this, there are many persons who are so sympathetically constituted that, without any further motive of vanity or self-interest [that is, without a mediate inclination], they find an inner pleasure in spreading joy around them and can rejoice in the satisfaction of others as their own work."
23 These people are in the fortunate situation of having inclinations that truly accord with the moral law. To the surprise of most first-time readers of this work, however, Kant remarks that such actions have "no true moral worth." 24 These acts are not immoral, but amoral.
Morality is restricted to the third type of human acts. These acts accord with the moral law, but they violate desire. Therefore, they must be done for the sake of the moral law. Kant presents the following example for acts in this category:
Suppose then the mind of [a] friend of mankind to be clouded over with his own sorrow so that all sympathy with the lot of others is extinguished, and suppose him still to have the power to benefit others in distress, even though he is not touched by their trouble because he is sufficiently absorbed with his own; and now suppose that, even though no inclination moves him any longer, he nevertheless tears himself from this deadly insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty-then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth. 25 Again, first-time readers of Kant are often struck by what, admittedly, looks like a counterintuitive situation. The person who does his duty and wants to do so appears to be less moral than the person who does his duty but does not want to do so. Kant labels the former amoral, the latter, moral. This very observation, however, reflects a belief that the person with a morality is always better than the person without one. More importantly, it betrays a naturalized conception of morality as something that exists in itself, that permeates every moment of human experience, leaving the individual with only two options: Either one is on this side of the morality/immorality opposition or one is on the other side. But this view is easily seen to be mistaken when we realize that the person whose inclinations accord with duty is preferable to the person who does his duty in divergence from his inclination precisely because the former, the amoral agent in this picture, has no need of morality at all, a condition superior to needing a morality in the first place. When we keep this in mind, it is easy to see why Kant exempts agents with immediate inclinations that accord with duty from his analysis of morality. Since they are not involved in a moral contest, they are irrelevant to moral inquiry. But if they fall out of moral inquiry, we have discovered something very important about morality-namely, that it appears precisely in the collision between our worldly inclinations and our sense of duty, which necessarily is opposed to these inclinations and thus not able to be derived from them.
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If we avoid the top-down pretensions of naturalized morality, we can see clearly which concrete moments of experience get naturalized into Kant's moral law: exactly those moments in which something from beyond the faculty of desire sets limits on the satisfaction of desire. To subtract naturalized morality from the picture is to place us on a different terrain, where ethical inquiry asks this question: If morality is revealed in the consciousness of the conflict between duty and inclination, what are the concrete conditions that allow for a consciousness of this conflict? At once, we find ourselves within a phenomenology of moral experience where a relational character of morality presents itself. The moral law emerges here, however, only when inclination is opposed to duty. It is not yet a thing-in-itself that reveals itself as a categorical imperative. This is the level of Levinas's work.
Broadly characterized, Levinas seeks a place within philosophy for the infinite that is situated beyond a totality constituted by the egoism of the self, whether this be on the level of sensibility or reason. This infinity reveals itself precisely insofar as it calls into question the egoist desire of the self, thereby holding the self responsible. Such a calling into question consists of the handing down of the commandment, "thou shalt not kill," which must not be taken literally, but as an injunction not to deny the transcendence of the other. It is an injunction to respect the in-itself-ness of the other by not dragging it into thought or absorbing it into the egoism of the self. And if it emerges concretely, this is because I find myself confronting a transcendent other that really is an end-in-itself-that is, transcendent-and that is not a part of the furniture in the world of the ego. Levinas finds this moment in the face-to-face encounter between persons.
Such a confrontation with transcendence inverts the egoism of the self and, as such, opposes any heteronomous inclination. It is the presence of a force situated beyond the faculty of desire that is necessary for the divergence between inclination and obligation discussed above. Without the pretensions of a naturalized morality hiding in the background, it is uniquely singular. Each confrontation with the transcendent consists of a new sanctioning of the law obligating me in my singularity here and now.
More important than a methodological difference between Levinas and Kant is the metaphysical transformation that occurs when these concrete moments uncovered by Levinas become naturalized, taken up as a theme and delivered over to language, when the saying of the uniquely singular is said within the universality of language. The transition is necessary: The confrontation with the other sets up a choice for the ego between inclination and obligation, thereby rendering it morally free. The alternatives that make up this choice, however, consist of what the self wants to do verses what it ought to do. It is not a worldly choice between desires, what we might call preferential freedom, but between desire and obligation. As such, only one of the alternatives can rightfully be chosen. Indeed, this confrontation between the self and something beyond the faculty of desire is necessary to raise an alternative from the level of a preference to an ought.
Once the ego finds within itself this moral freedom, which must be opposed to the preferential freedom of a choice between desires, it is transported into the domain of practical reason, as the nature of the particular moral conflict is thought out explicitly in terms of the moral law. 27 In becoming aware of the moral ought, which is precisely consciousness of the fact that I must respect the in-itself-ness of the transcendence confronting me, I am simultaneously aware of the categorical imperative. The relationship is as tight as that between the saying and the said. Levinas writes, "That the saying must bear a said is a necessity of the same order as that which imposes a society with laws, institutions and social relations."
28 At bottom this means that Kantian practical reason already includes a respect for the transcendence of the other buried deeply within the universality of law as such. It is not the cold reason that can be characterized as the egoism of the self, but a reason redeemed by the ethical. That is, it is a responsible reason. Consequently, 27. Kant provides his own telling example in the Critique of Practical Reason, 30. "Suppose that someone says his lust is irresistible when the desired object and opportunity are present. Ask him whether he would not control his passion if, in front of the house where he has this opportunity, a gallows were erected on which he would be hanged immediately after gratifying his lust. We do not have to guess very long what his answer would be. But ask him whether he thinks it would be possible for him to overcome his love of life, however great it may be, if his sovereign threatened him with the same sudden death unless he made a false deposition against an honorable man whom the ruler wished to destroy under a plausible pretext. Whether he would or not he perhaps will not venture to say; but that it would be possible for him he would certainly admit without hesitation. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he knows that he ought, and he recognizes that he is free-a fact which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him." 28. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 88. even though Kant presents his ethics without tracing it back to a confrontation with a concrete other, it nonetheless takes this other into account.
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We have finally traced Kantian universality back to an encounter with a transcendence situated beyond the faculty of desire and identified the precise point where Levinas's moral phenomenology contacts Kant's metaphysics of morals. But all of this must be taken in the most preliminary fashion. Many problems remain. We have identified two distinct levels of ethical metaphysics that are intimately related in the necessary connection between the saying and the said, or the concrete moral encounter and its translation into rationality. Understanding the difference between the two levels is critical, along with the metaphysical comportments necessary to cross from one level to the next. The two levels do not assimilate into a unified picture, but remain suspended in a difference that is not the equidistant difference of Derrida, but an ethical difference in which one pole serves as the prior to the other. 30 If they were to assimilate, everything that is good on the rational level of ethics would be destroyed precisely because it would forever fail to gravitate toward the concrete.
One mode of this difference, for instance, consists in the fact that on the lower levels that Levinas analyzes, the self is always asymmetrically situated in reference to the other, whereas on the higher levels the self achieves equality with the other and can therefore be a recipient of moral rights. I cannot examine this topic, well worth a separate essay, here; at the moment, it must be enough to assert that this does not present the problems that it initially appears to present, and that Levinas himself recognizes this difference: "Whatever be the ways that lead to the superstructure of society, in justice the dissymetry that holds me at odds with regard to the other will find again law, autonomy, equality." 31 29. Levinas admits the possibility of a responsible reason in Totality and Infinity and elsewhere. See page 88: "The presence of the Other, a privileged heteronomy, does not clash with freedom but invests it. . . . The essence of reason consists not in securing for man a foundation and powers, but in calling him in question and in inviting him to justice." Levinas's notion of invested freedom is along the lines of Kant's view of freedom that cannot be taken to be merely arbitrary. Freedom for Kant is already caught in the grip of the ethical.
30. In his famous essay on Levinas and Heidegger, Derrida writes, "Are we Jews? Are we Greeks? We live in the difference between the Jew and the Greek, which is perhaps the unity of what is called history. We live in and of difference, that is, in hypocrisy, about which Levinas so profoundly says that it is 'not only a base contingent defect of man, but the underlying rending of a world attached to both the philosophers and the prophets'." See Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 153. By setting the Jew and Greek equally apart, Derrida ends in moral paralysis. In the background of this paper, I am playing with the possibility that a just transition occurs from the concrete to the ideal by the proper obediential response to transcendence at the very origin of the rational and moral order. This is an inherently Christian viewpoint that is not a mere synthesis of the Hebraic and the Hellenic but a way of living between them without ending in hypocrisy. Further development of this theme will have to await another work.
31. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1981), 127.
Another problem left for us is the necessity to work out the mechanisms of transformation from the lower to the higher levels. We have only identified the transformation, we have not said how it comes about. Levinas poses a partial explanation with his analysis of the entry of the third party, 32 and Husserl provides the details for the conceptual transformation in his later works. 33 Kierkegaard provides a more detailed account than either in Fear and Trembling, where a "teleological suspension of the ethical" is necessary to justify the rational domain of ethics. By situating the single individual concretely in absolute relation to the absolute outside of the social order, the social order itself becomes justified. This indeed is the central theme of the book, which invokes "everything good for the system," 34 by making the system relative to a concrete encounter with an absolute outside the rational order and, in so doing, redeeming the rational order. 35 We have not the space to work out the details of the transformation, though we have indicated its possibility for Levinas and the role that it would have for grounding Kantian ethics. This grounding does not undermine the Kantian project in the least. The universality of the moral law, as worked out by Kant, carries as much objective validity as the ideal shapes of geometry, which are also naturalized from concrete appearances in experience. It does, however, resituate Kant's ethics more along the lines of a theory of the good state, rather than a personal morality, which must forever find itself with its feet on the ground. Oddly enough, the transformation manages to get a universal deontology out of a divine command theory of ethics, suggesting that the good state is situated only on the solid foundation of religion, in which obediential comportment toward the transcendent justifies all civic law. Can we not hear echoing in the distance Kant's idea that the existence of God is also affirmed by practical reason, where it must be denied by the speculative?
36 No doubt, a deeper insight on this point can be found by more carefully examining the critical difference between Levinas and Kant. 
